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UTILITY AS A FACTOR IN CHEMICAL
PATENTABILITY
INTRODUCTION
Chemical discoveries are patentable under the patent laws' whose
initial sections define the subject matter and conditions of patentability:
"Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, .
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and require-
ments of this title.2 . . . A patent may not be obtained . . . if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have
been obvious . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which said subject matter pertains.3 . . . The term 'process' means
process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process
[or] . . . composition of matter, or material." 4
The requirement of novelty is further elaborated in section 102: 5 if there
was knowledge or use of the subject matter of the application in the United
States prior to the invention by the applicant,6 or if the invention was
described in a printed publication in the United States or a foreign coun-
try more than a year before the patent application is filed,7 the invention
is not "new." 8
The second statutory requirement-that of utility-has been inter-
preted to mean that the invention must be useful in the applied rather than
in the pure sciences, thereby making application in the practical affairs
of life a requisite of patentability.9 Employment of this test in the area
of chemical inventions has brought criticism from writers who argue that
135 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1958).
2 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1958).
3 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1958).
435 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1958).
5 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1958).
635 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1958).
735 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1958).
8 Whether or not the applicant is aware of prior publication, it is deemed proof
that he has merely duplicated the prior invention of another. See Merit Mfg. Co. v.
Hero Mfg. Co., 185 F.2d 350, 352 (2d Cir. 1950). For an exhaustive treatment of the
statutory bars to invention see Note, Prior Art in the Patent Law, 73 HARv. L. REv.
369 (1959).
9 "To possess utility, an invention must be capable of producing a result, and that
result must be a good result capable of being so applied in practical affairs as to prove
advantageous in the ordinary pursuits of life." 1 WaER, PATENTs § 64, at 310
(1937). See Flintkote Co. v. National Asbestos Mfg. Co., 52 F.2d 719 (3d Cir.
1931); Wheeler v. Clipper Mower Co., 29 Fed. Cas. 881 (No. 17493) (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1872).
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new compositions of matter are inherently useful inasmuch as the nature
of chemical science requires methodical progress in the development of
compounds and in the collection of masses of data. 10 Newly discovered
compositions of matter frequently remain mere laboratory curiosities until
some commercial use is found; a sufficient number of striking examples
exists 1 to enable the proponents of the "pure science" approach to argue
that the discovery of any hitherto unknown compound falls within the
purpose of the constitutional grant of power-that is, promotion of science
and the useful arts ' 2 -and thus merits patentability. While it may be
argued that the strict practical utility requirement is somewhat mitigated
by the doctrine of RCA v. Radio Eng'r Labs., Inc.,13 which implied that
the first inventor, though unaware of the utility of his invention, may
obtain a patent when another puts it to practical use,' 4 the RCA case
may offer little relief in actuality inasmuch as one who discovers a new,
though nonutilitarian, compound will almost certainly make his findings
public, thus precluding even himself from later obtaining a patent. In any
event, however, usefulness for pure science alone is still not sufficient to
give rise to patentability.
10 Boyle & Parker, Patents for New Chemical Compounds, 27 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y
831 (1945). See also Note, The Requirement of Utility in Chemical Patent Appli-
cations, 20 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 727, 728 (1952).
11 "Reference might be made to the two hydrocarbon chemicals styrene and buta-
diene, both of which were discovered and described as to their properties over 50
years ago. But it has only been within the past decade that it has been discovered
that styrene is capable of producing an extremely clear plastic which has found
extensive use in the present war. . . . The compound known as sulfamic acid was
originally discovered and described over 65 years ago by Berglund. But it is only
recently that this acid has found use as a flame proofing agent and utility in the dyeing
art. Acetanilide was discovered by Beckman about 1875 but for many years it re-
mained a laboratory curiosity until it was discovered to possess fever-producing
properties. The compound now sold under the trade name 'Benzidrine' (1-phenyl-2-
aminopropane) was originally discovered in 1887 but its valuable anti-soporific proper-
ties were first described in the U.S. patent no. 1,921,424 issued in 1933. Many more
examples could be given but one which has recently gained much prominence is that
of DDT (dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane). This compound was originally synthe-
sized some 60 years ago by Othmar Zadler but its astounding insecticidal properties
were independently discovered within the past 8 years." Boyle & Parker, supra note
10, at 837. While in the examples given above a patent given at the time of the
discovery would have expired by the time the utility was discovered, the problem of
discovery of utility within the period of patent monopoly nonetheless exists in other
situations.
12 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, is the source of the patent power: "The Congress shall
have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.
13 293 U.S. 1 (1934).
14 Other cases have broadened this implication of RCA. See, e.g., the interpretation
of the RCA case in Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co. v. Watson, 120 U.S.P.Q. 265, 266,
170 F. Supp. 78, 79 (D.D.C. 1959): "Thus, in Radio Corporation of America v.
Radio Engineering Laboratories . . . it was concluded that if a person makes an
invention or discovery accidentally, and does not realize its significance or its use-
fulness, and makes no use of it, nevertheless, he is entitled to a patent as a prior
inventor as against a later inventor, who, as a result of assiduous efforts, developed
the device in question, understood its usefulness and immediately applied it for that
purpose."
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Speculative explanations of the practical utility-pure science distinc-
tion find little support in judicial authority. It may be that compounds
useful only in pure science were denied patentability because their utility,
not being apparent or even understandable to practical men of affairs,
was not utility in the sense in which the nonscientific and judicial com-
munity used the term. Another possible explanation is that the distinc-
tion may have developed as a corollary to the "law of nature" rule,15
the reasoning being that one who has discovered a compound with no
practical usefulness has merely discovered the action of a "law of nature."
Yet another requirement is that the invention be a significant step
forward in the art to which it pertains; it must not be a step obvious to
a person having ordinary skill in the art.16 Because of the complexity
of the scientific realm, the question of whether a particular invention
makes an advance sufficient to be patentable is a major issue of patent
litigation. This requirement takes on added significance in that it ultimately
involves a subjective judgment.17
' 5 An analysis of the factors which lend "invention" to a chemical composition
is complicated to some extent by the general proposition that laws of nature are not
patentable. The most pointed statement of this doctrine is contained in Funk Bros.
Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948). There, applicant discovered
that certain strains of bacteria could be combined in a convenient multipackage form
to enable inoculation of all types of leguminous plants with nitrogen fixing bacteria;
previously it had been possible to package only a single strain inasmuch as each type
inhibited the growth of the others. The Court refused a patent on the ground that
"the [noninhibitory] qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun, electricity,
or the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men. They
are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none."
Id. at 130. It is immediately apparent that inasmuch as all chemical phenomena
depend on "laws of nature," such laws are indeed patentable at least in their tangible,
physical form. The argument that new compositions of matter are unpatentable as
"laws of nature!' has been rejected by the courts and is not a helpful tool in chemical
patent cases. See Schering Corp. v. Gilbert, 153 F.2d 428, 432 (2d Cir. 1946). Never-
theless, the "law of nature" rule will be applied where a proposed invention attempts
to claim a monopoly of what appears to be a fundamental theorem (such as Newton's
first law of motion) and where a patent, if granted, would impose restrictions on
other inventors or on the public in general. Limited to such cases, the rule appears
to be akin to another principle: that abstract ideas cannot be patented. See, e.g.,
Fowler v. City of New York, 121 Fed. 747, 748 (2d Cir. 1903). There are, however,
instances outside the chemical patent area where the Court has not accepted this
limited interpretation of the "law of nature" rule and has denied patents on proposed
inventions merely because they depended upon a previously unknown basic law of
nature, even though the granting of the patent would not restrict others from utilizing
the newly discovered principle in other applications. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculant Co., supra. The Supreme Court's position in this regard was severely
criticized in Kip, The Patentability of Natural Phenomena, 20 GEo. WAsin. L. REv.
371 (1952).
16 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1958).
17Judge Hand pointed out in Kirsch Mfg. Co. v. Gould Mersereau Co., 6 F.2d
793, 794 (2d Cir. 1925), that "objective tests may be of value vaguely to give us a
sense of direction, but the final destination can be only loosely indicated. An invention
is a new display of ingenuity beyond the compass of the routineer, and in the end
that is all that can be said about it. Courts cannot avoid the duty of divining as
best they can what the day to day capacity of the ordinary artisan will produce. This
they attempt by looking at the history of the art, the occasion for the invention, its
success, its independent repetition at about the same time, and the state of the under-
lying art, which was a condition upon its appearance at all. Yet, when all is said,
there will remain cases when we can only fall back upon such good sense as we may
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The requirements for patentability-novelty, utility and lack of ob-
viousness-are not easily segregated. Research is aimed at finding products
useful commercially. If a discovery is more useful than anything be-
fore it, the implication is that it is new or someone would have used or
published it in the particular field. Moreover, if something is new it may
usually be said not to have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in
the art. And if it has such utility as to become a commercial success,
the implication is that it was not obvious to one skilled in the art or it
would have been in free use. The interrelation of these criteria is illus-
trated by the various objective tests employed by the Patent Office and
the courts to determine if a discovery constitutes "invention," including:
new and unexpected results,18 filling a long-felt need, 19 failure of other
workers to solve the problem in a different way,
20 great impact on the art 21
and commercial success. 22 However, all of these tests are merely factors
to be weighed in the light of particular circumstances and no single, pre-
cise, objective criterion of invention is available.23 Prior to the enactment
of the present Patent Act in 1952, the Supreme Court had formulated a
standard for invention which required that the discovery be the result
of a "flash of creative genius." 24 Whether this high standard of pat-
entability was rejected by the Patent Act of 1952 is disputable, but recent
judicial interpretation indicates that the standard of invention has not been
lowered.
2 5
The question of what is inventive takes on added complexity in the
field of chemistry. Patentable mechanical items are often combinations of
known elements which, added together, reach a result which is more than
have, and in these we cannot help exposing the inventor to the hazard inherent in
hypostatizing such modifications in the existing arts as are within the limited imagi-
nation of the journeyman. There comes a point when the question must be resolved
by a subjective opinion as to what seems an easy step and what does not. We must
try to correct our standard by such objective references as we can, but in the end
the judgment will appear, and no doubt be, to a large extent personal, and in that
sense arbitrary."
18 1 WALKER, PATENTS §25, at 120 (1937).
19 Id. § 25, at 33 (Supp. 1959).
20 1 WALKER, PATENTS § 25, at 125 (1937).
2 1 Id. at 122.
22 Id. §44.
23 Id. § 25, at 135-36.
24 Cuno Eng'r Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941).
25 "Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention
was made." 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1958). In House Comm. on the Judiciary, Revision
of Title 35, United States Code, H.R. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1952) (Ap-
pendix), it is stated "it is immaterial whether [the invention] . . . resulted from
long toil and experimentation or from a flash of genius." For authority that this
change has lowered the standard of invention, see Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical
Co., 224 F.2d 530 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 911 (1955). Contra, Borkland v.
Pederson, 244 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1957) ; General Motors Corp. v. Estate Stove Co.,
203 F.2d 912 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 822 (1953) ; but see Moist Cold Re-
frigerator Co. v. Lou Johnson Co., 249 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356
U.S. 968 (1958). The cases indicate that there may be significant differences from
circuit to circuit regarding the stringency with which the statutory requisites are
applied in patent litigation.
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the mere sum of the aggregate components; 26 there, patentability hinges
on whether a particular result reaches the heights of newness, usefulness
and unobviousness required for the patent monopoly.27 But chemical
compound patentability cannot be judged on a synergistic basis. All com-
pounds are made up of the basic chemical elements and every compound
is so different from its component elements that it would seem to be per se
more than a sum of aggregates. Thus, the mechanical test in the field
of chemistry is of no avail. Moreover, the same elements may combine in
different ways, in numerous proportions, or even in the same proportions
(isomers 28) to form compounds with different molecular structures and
properties. And the degree of predictability of the existence and proper-
ties of new chemical compounds is generally low. - However, in certain
areas chemists have developed classifications within which some predic-
tability is possible, such as the homologous series in organic chemistry.
0
For proposed inventions which can be classified as members of homologous
series, a presumption of unpatentability has been erected which can be
rebutted only if the compound exhibits "beneficial" properties which could
not be predicted from its relation to other members of the series.8 1
There are other relationships where the existence of a compound can be
easily predicted, such as acid-base or substitution reactions.3 2 Proposed
compositions may also be subject to attack as "obvious" where the ex-
istence of a basic compound may have been suggested by a known and
more complex substance or where invention is dependent upon the critical-
ness of proportion of a mixture of known elements.
33
2 6 See the discussion of the term "aggregation" in Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 150-52 (1950).
2 7 TouLmiN, PATENTS 76-84 (1949).
2 8 Isomers are chemical compounds of the same elements in the same proportions
but with differing structures and properties. PAULING, COLLEGE CHEMISTRY 140 (2d
ed. 1955).
20 Naamlooze Venootschafs: W. A. Scholtens Chemische Fabrieken v. Coe, 132
F.2d 573, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1942); General Elec. Co. v. Laco-Philips Co., 233 Fed. 96,
103 (2d Cir. 1916).
3 0 RICHTER, ORGANIC CHEMISTRY 9 (2d ed. 1943). A homologue is an organic
compound which differs from a prior organic compound by CH or a multiple thereof.
However, this definition does not apply in all cases and often the question of what is
a homologue is a subject of litigation. See notes 61-67 infra and accompanying text.
31 In re Henze, 37 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1009, 1015, 181 F.2d 196, 201 (1950);
In re Hass, 31 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 903, 141 F.2d 127 (1944).
32 Acid-base reactions are among the surest and most predictable in the chemical
field. Certain types of substitution reactions are easily predictable, e.g., the substitu-





33 Metallic alloy patents are the outstanding examples of this class. See notes
86-90 infra and accompanying text.
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It is the purpose of this Note to analyze the various factors which
lend patentability to chemical discoveries as compositions of matter and,
to a limited extent, as new uses for compositions of matter. It is assumed
throughout that the patentability of the proposed composition is not pre-
vented by prior publication, use, sale or invention by the applicant or
another so as to dearly negate patentability. The analysis is limited to
cases in which invention is doubtful because of similarity to prior art.
34
THE RATIONALIZATION OF THE UTILITY REQUIREMENT
The utility requirement is designed to direct inventive talents toward
only those discoveries beneficial to mankind; the obligation of precise
disclosure is aimed at manifesting such utility and apprising those skilled
in the particular art that they may make use of the invention for the benefit
of the public.8 5
Inasmuch as the utility required of an invention is utility in practical
application, even a compound with great usefulness in solving the problems
of pure science does not possess the quality necessary for patentability.3
6
The case coming closest to finding the requisite utility where application
to the problems of pure science was involved is Potter v. Tone; '7 in
holding a chemical compound patentable merely because of its chemical
reducing and nonconductivity properties, the court stated that "its value
for educational purposes in demonstrating to chemists the character and
properties of 'the long-sought silicon monoxide;' its use as a reducing agent
in chemical reactions, and the fact that it is a nonconductor of electricity,-
are sufficient to assist in promoting the progress of the useful arts and to
establish the utility of the invention." 38 Recent cases appear not to have
followed this lead. In Isenstead v. Watson," a method and composition
for shifting blood proteins, though apparently a significant advancement
in pure science, was held unpatentable on a declaration of usefulness in
testing the function of the human liver while gathering data in medical
research. Similarly, in Ex parte Pennell,4 ° a compound which had the
property of extending the active life of blood hemoglobin was rejected.
The showing of utility necessary to support a patent on a composi-
tion of matter varies with the facts of any given patent application.4'
34 Also beyond the scope of this Note are the problems relative to Potts v. Coe,
145 F.2d 27, denying motion to vacate 140 F.2d 470 (D.C. Cir. 1944), where it was
stated that a patent cannot be obtained on a discovery made by an employee in a
corporate laboratory unless "the discovery is above the level of the art current in its
own corporate laboratory and other corporate laboratories with which it has connec-
tions and affiliations." 145 F.2d at 28.
35 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1958).
36 See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
3736 App. D.C. 181 (D.C. Cir. 1911).
3
8 1d. at 185.
89 157 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1957).
40 99 U.S.P.Q. 56 (P.O. Bd. App. 1952).
41 See Note, The Requirement of Utility in Chemical Patent Applications, 20
GEo. WAsHa. L. RFv. 727 (1952).
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Pharmacological patent applications are usually required to show not only
efficacy in treatment but also safety for human use. 2  In most cases, tests
and affidavits are required to show the "reduction to practice" which
evidences utility; 43 these tests must establish utility "beyond probability
of failure" 44 in accomplishing the ultimate purpose toward which the
development of the compound was directed. However, if the utility of a
particular compound is well understood in the art, no test results need
be shown. 45
Unexpected Utility of Predictable Compounds
In the case of a compound whose existence was not predictable by the
contemporary state of chemical science, or, in other words, which is new
and unobvious, only minimal utility need be shown. Such a discovery,
however, is the rare case; economical research requires that new com-
pounds be developed by methods which have some probability of success
and where some indication exists that a new compound is possible. Here
lies the principal reason for chemical patent litigation: when is the pre-
dictability required for economical research such that the existence of
the compound and its properties are obvious to one possessing ordinary
skill in the art, thus negating patentability? The most difficult aspect of
this problem arises where the existence of a compound is somewhat pre-
dictable, but it undergoes certain unforeseeable complex reactions-whose
exact nature may not be understood-which make the compound very
useful in practical application. This situation is the one which appears
most frequently in chemical patent litigation, and it is here that the utility
factor is usually decisive; often it is the only manifest and vivid criterion
available for judging whether a new compound rises to the height of
"invention." 46 For example, where the compound is a homologue, it is not
always possible to predict its properties even though its probable existence,
form, boiling point and vapor pressure may be ascertainable. Unforeseen
beneficial properties also imply the existence of physical characteristics
which tend to distinguish the new compound from those of prior art, thus
42 E.g., Ex parte Appeal No. 25726, 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 381 (1952) ; see Ex
parte Wolf, 65 U.S.P.Q. 527 (P.O. Bd. App. 1945); Prusack, The Requirement for
Proof of Utility in Patent Applications for Therapeutic Products, 35 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 616 (1953). Compare Blicke v. Treves, 44 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 753, 241 F.2d
718 (1957).
43 Cf. Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chem. Corp., 276 U.S. 358 (1928); E. I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 120 F. Supp. 697 (D.D.C.
1954).
44 Taylor v. Swingle, 30 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1219, 1222-23, 136 F.2d 914, 917
(1943). (Emphasis added.)
45 See Saklatwalla v. Marburg, 36 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 791, 172 F.2d 227 (1949)
(dictum); Kyrides v. Bruson, 26 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 986, 102 F.2d 416 (1939);
Larson v. Eicher, 18 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1497, 49 F.2d 1029 (1931).
46 Mechanical patents, often being the combination of many components into a
more complex machine, are amenable to more objective standards of invention such
as physical design, shape and size; a chemical compound, however, has none of these
properties and must be judged by its reactions wherein lie the utility of all chemicals.
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fulfilling also the requirement of novelty. And this difference from
prior art can be measured best if not solely by the utility of the compound
in actual use. Thus, sufficient utility will lend patentability in otherwise
doubtful homologous series cases.
47
Alloy patent cases and those involving patents on compounds derived
from more complex substances show a tendency toward emphasis of the
utility factor similar to that exhibited in cases where the existence of the
compound was predictable. Alloys are composed of the metallic elements,
none of which are new or unobvious and most of which have been used
together in various combinations. However, the use of critical propor-
tions can produce alloys better adapted for specific uses than those of prior
art. Inasmuch as the new properties of this mixture of known elements
are the only measure of "invention" and inasmuch as the properties are
shown only by better adaptation for specific uses, utility is the chief
determinant of the patentability of alloys. 48 In the case where a com-
pound is a derivative of a more complex substance, the question of pat-
entability is more difficult. For instance, if one finds that a certain herb
cures headaches and then isolates the active ingredient, 49 is he an inventor
or is he merely a technician carrying out a laboratory process for the
production of a concentrated product which was obvious from the ex-
istence of the active ingredient in nature? If the isolated ingredient
shows markedly greater utility than the mother substance and if the iden-
tity of the active ingredient was not previously known, the courts have
tended toward patentability. 0
Utility, then, has two meanings in the law of chemical patents: (1) the
narrow technical sense of that minimum utility necessary to meet the con-
stitutional and statutory standard for a compound whose existence was
not predictable; and (2) that utility which appears to be used interchange-
ably with such terms as "unexpected results" or "unobvious beneficial
properties" and which thereby becomes also a standard of patentable
47 See, e.g., Ex parte Nabenhauer, 68 U.S.P.Q. 224 (P.O. Bd. App. 1942). The
only available paper on the subject is in accord with this view. See Note, The Re-
quirement of Utility in Chemical Patent Applications, 20 GEo. WAsH. L. Rxv. 727,
729 (1952).
48 See, e.g., Becket v. Coe, 98 F.2d 332 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
49 This was the factual situation in Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld
Co., 179 Fed. 701 (7th Cir. 1910), cert. denied, 220 U.S. 622 (1911). The court upheld
the validity of a patent on the pure form of a known composition of matter where the
pure product (aspirin) had utility as a therapeutic agent markedly greater than that
of the impure form.
50 See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford & Co., 196 Fed. 496 (2d Cir. 1912),
where the court sustained a patent for a natural product derivative which had great
commercial and therapeutic value, whereas the natural roduct had only limited thera-
peutic value and in many cases produced harmful if not fatal results. In Merck &
Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958), a synthetic fer-
mentation product derived from the growth of several species of bacteria was held
patentable. The product, B12, was found to have superior utility as a therapeutic
agent but was identical in behavior to an extract customarily derived from the liver
of cattle. In holding the claims valid, the court emphasized the product's vastly superior
therapeutic properties.
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novelty. It is in the latter sense that the term is used throughout this
Note.
The justification for the utility requirement as an incentive to encourage
beneficial inventions encounters difficulty where a patent, granted upon a
showing of relatively little utility, gives the inventor the right to exclude
others from using the patented compound even where another, discovering
a more important use for it, has obtained a "process patent" on the new
use.5' The purposes of the patent law to encourage new and useful com-
positions would not likely be thwarted if an inventor of a compound which
was later beneficially applied along different lines were denied the right to
exclude the process patentee from the use of the compound in the new
process; surely the original inventor would not have refrained from in-
venting merely because his exclusionary power was not absolute. On the
other hand, it would be impractical to give the process patentee a right to
control manufacture for use in his process where the chemical is a staple;
the firm manufacturing the compound cannot be expected to trace its use by
purchasers. The same practical problems prevent limiting the compound's
inventor to collecting royalties upon the chemical only when manufactured
for the use disclosed in his patent application-the composition patent would
be much less valuable if the patentee had to prove that a company manu-
facturing the compound without authority was doing so for the disclosed
use.
A possible alternative that may be acceptable in limited circumstances
would be to allow the process patentee the right to make and use the chem-
ical royalty-free, but only to the extent needed for use in his process and
only if he himself uses or controls the use of the process. Such limitations
are necessary because, if the process patentee purchased the chemical rather
than manufactured it, the manufacturer could not be expected to pay the
product patentee royalties on a basis which required him to trace the prod-
uct's use and in effect to vouch for the integrity of the process patentee.
And if the compound were widely used by the public and the process
patentee were to manufacture and sell it on the open market, it could be
employed for any use and thus defeat the rights of the product patentee.
On the other hand, allowing the process patentee to sell the compound on
the open market may be a risk that the product patentee should be required
to bear; and if the process patentee is actively inducing infringement of the
original use or is knowingly selling to infringers, the ordinary contributory
infringement action is available. Moreover, the product patentee will have
had the patent monopoly for several years before the process patent was
developed and will have already derived substantial benefits. Ultimately
the question resolves itself to one of how important the patent incentive
5135 U.S.C. §271(a) (1958) provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this
title, whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention . . .
infringes the patent." The power to exclude from use is not limited to the use dis-
closed in the patent application; even use in a patented process infringes the com-
position patent on the article.
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is to the development of new chemical compounds. If it is not a powerful
factor, then the right to make, use and sell the product for the time before
which a new use is developed may be sufficient incentive even if the process
patentee were given a similar right after his discovery of a new use.
New Uses and the Process Patent
A "new use of a known . . . composition of matter" is patentable
under the provisions of sections 100(b) and 101(b) of the patent laws.
Such a patent on a new use is obtainable if there is no indication from the
prior art, under the usual standard of obviousness to one skilled in the art,
that the compound was useful for the proposed purpose.52 Thus, in Ex
parte Campbell,53 a method of preventing the clotting of blood was held
patentable as a new use where the compound itself was not anticipated by
prior art and its use as an anticoagulant therefore could not have been
anticipated. 4
A "new use" patent may be obtained for compositions not themselves
patentable. In Joseph Bancroft & Sons v. Watson,55 applicant obtained
a patent on a process of finishing textiles with cyclic urea, an old and known
compound; and in Rohm & Haas Co. v. Roberts Chems., Inc.,56 a patent
for the use of a compound as a fungicide was upheld where the utilized
compound was similar to others used as fungicides but far more effective.
On the other hand, in Ex parte Cook,57 a patent was refused on the new
use of a lubricant oil as a tin pot oil. From these cases, it appears that a
process patent may be obtained for a new use of a known compound if there
is a showing of utility markedly greater than that available from other com-
pounds used for the same purpose. Where such a showing cannot be
made-as where a known compound, normally used for Y purpose, is
5 2 The same standard of patentability is applied to process patents as to other
patents under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1958). Prior to the Patent Act of 1952 and § 100(b),
it appears that a new use for a known composition of matter was not patent-
able. Old Town Ribbon & Carbon Co. v. Columbia Ribbon & Carbon Mfg. Co., 159
F.2d 379 (2d Cir. 1947). In Ryan, Patentability of a New Use for an Old Composi-
tion of Matter, 15 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 284 (1947), the author concludes that the
courts had usually followed the dogma that a new use for an old composition of
matter is not patentable, but if some change in the old composition was made, such
as a change in particle size or in critical proportions and the change was sufficient in
degree, an argument could be made for patentability.
53 99 U.S.P.Q. 51 (P.O. Bd. App. 1952).
54 In Campbell, it appears that the applicants could have received a patent on
the compound itself and may even have done so before application for the process
patent. However, the case as reported does not indicate that any application was
made for a patent on the compound.
55170 F. Supp. 78 (D.D.C. 1959). Here the court interpreted §100(b) as
introducing a new principle that a new use for an old composition of matter is
patentable if the conditions of patentability are met. Id. at 79-80. However, in
Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 16 (1954), the author
claims that this always has been the law. Either position is difficult to support by
case law.
56245 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1957).
57105 U.S.P.Q. 504 (P.O. Ed. App. 1954).
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found no more useful for X purpose than other presently used compositions
-a process patent for the use of the compound in X purpose is not
obtainable.58
Enforcement of Process Patents
Generally speaking, a patent on a new use is not as valuable as a com-
position patent; the process is often one utilized by many small users
against whom the patent could not be economically enforced. A process
patent is valuable only if it is used by individual concerns on a scale large
enough to justify an infringement action; on the other hand, a composition
patent will allow the patentee to recover royalties on the manufacture of
the compound regardless of its application and whether or not its use is
patentable. However, a holder of a process patent may be able to sue the
manufacturers and distributors of a compound used in the infringement of
his patent as contributory infringers.59
It seems probable that in many cases the chemical used in the process
will be a staple, or will be suitable for a substantial noninfringing use, and
that therefore no contributory infringement action will lie. But these are
not the only hurdles to such an action. The compound must be a material
part of the patented process, and the patentee must prove that the alleged
infringer knew the product was being used to infringe a patented process
and that the goods were especially made for that purpose. However, it is
possible that, in such instances as homologous series and group substitution,
the new chemical will have a known utility only for the use declared in the
process patent application; and, at least until wider use is found, manu-
facture alone will raise the presumption of contributory infringement. But
in most cases the difficulties of proof appear to be formidable; thus it is not
surprising that since the Patent Act of 1952 only one case was discovered
wherein a holder of a "new use" patent on a composition of matter used
by small consumers successfully sued a manufacturer of the composition as
58 See Ex parte Cook, 105 U.S.P.Q. 504 (P.O. Bd. App. 1954). Here applicant
sought to prove novelty for his new use by the addition of salts to render the oil
mixture more active. However, the difference in composition between applicant's
claim and that of a prior patent (Ballard, 2,270,102) for use as a lubricant was
insufficient for novelty, and the use was forced to stand for patentability solely on the
significance of its utility. When compared with Joseph Bancroft & Sons v. Watson,
170 F. Supp. 78 (D.D.C. 1950), it appears that the cases have the common factor of
an old composition of matter, but the use in Bancroft led to utility previously unknown
in the art; apparently no such utility was found in the Cook application.
59 Contributory infringement actions are governed by § 271(c) of the Patent Act
which provides: "Whoever sells a . . . composition, or a material . . . for use in
practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing
the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of
such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer." 35 U.S.C. § 271(c)
(1958). Prior to this statute the Supreme Court had held in Leitch Mfg. Co. v.
Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938), that one who knowingly made and sold an unpatented
substance for use in patented process was not a contributory infringer. It is doubtful
that the statute would require the opposite holding today, since the Court viewed the
article there involved as a staple of commerce. Id. at 460.
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a contributory infringer.60 There, the patentee had a process patent on the
use of a chemical as a fungicide. Inasmuch as direct infringement actions
against hundreds of small farmer-users would have been impractical, the
patentee sued the manufacturer. Such an action proved feasible because
the chemical was not usable except as a fungicide; it therefore followed
that it was not a staple and was knowingly manufactured to infringe a
patented process.
PROBLEM AREAS IN CHEMICAL PATENT LAW
Homologous Series Patterns
The general doctrine in respect to the patentability of the members of
a homologous series 61 is that there is a presumption of unpatentability
which is rebuttable by showing the homologue has unobvious and un-
expected beneficial properties not possessed by other compounds in the
series.62 "Unobvious and unexpected" would appear to mean nothing more
than that a compound possesses properties which were not predictable by
prior art. Since these must be "beneficial" properties, that is, utilitarian,
it seems that a showing of utility will make patentable a homologous com-
pound whose existence could be predicted but whose beneficial properties
were unforeseen. In Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Watson,63 a homologous com-
pound was held patentable where it was beneficial in the treatment of
irreversible shock and coronary occlusion even though the prior art com-
pounds also worked in giving some measure of relief; the new compound,
however, had lifesaving properties while those of the prior art lacked this
significant characteristic. Similarly, in Ruskin v. Watson,64 the presump-
tion of unpatentability was held to have been rebutted when the homologue
gave some relief in muscular spasm cases; other members of the series
possessed no such properties. It would seem that Ruskin is the clearer case
for patentability-the inventor had no hint from the prior members of the
series that the desired properties might exist in other homologues. The
standard doctrine strictly applied would seem to say that in order to obtain
a patent on a member of a homologous series one must be lucky enough
to have his research culminate in something so unexpected that he had no
predictable scientific basis for believing that the result would occur. How-
6 0 Rohm & Haas Co. v. Roberts Chems., Inc., 245 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1957) (de-
fendant also liable as direct infringer).
61 Not all compounds that differ by CH, are held to be homologues. In re Jones,
32 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1020, 149 F.2d 501 (1945), held that toluene is a homologue
of benzene, but that benzene is not a homologue of napthalene. Ex parte Fauque,
121 U.S.P.Q. 425 (P.O. Bd. App. 1954), held that a compound is a homologue even
though it differs by CH 2 on two different rings. And in Ex parte Tilford, 121
U.S.P.Q. 347 (P.O. Ed. App. 1953), compounds differed by CH2 but were not
homologous inasmuch as the difference was not a methylene group but rather a
difference in tertiary and quarternary carbon atoms.
6 2 In re Henze, 37 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1009, 1015, 181 F.2d 196, 201 (1950).
63 135 F. Supp. 173 (D.D.C. 1955).
64 123 F. Supp. 33 (D.D.C. 1954).
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ever, inasmuch as chemical advances must be made on the basis of the
low predictability which is available, the cases seem to defer to necessity
in allowing some measure of predictability in the properties of the proposed
composition. This tendency, illustrated in Sterling Drug, is present in
another recent case, Ex parte Opfermann,6 5 where a product patent was
granted on a homologue used in treating blood anemia. The prior art
homologue was similarly useful but the new compound produced no un-
desirable side effects. The court granted the patent because the "claimed
compound possesses unobvious superiority over its homolog of the prior
art in the field of the disclosed utility . . . ." 6 Inasmuch as the claimed
compounds in Sterling Drug and Opfermann are obvious homologues, it
appears that they can be explained only on the unexpected utility theory.
This explanation is fortified by recent cases rejecting obvious homologues
where the claimed compounds were not shown to possess "beneficial"
(utilitarian) properties superior to prior art homologues. 67 These cases
in actuality are using the language of "utility" interchangeably with that
of "beneficial properties."
Other Relationships
The homologous series is but one type of relationship recognized by
chemists as indicative of the predictive possibilities regarding the existence
of compounds. Prediction is possible in other ways, but the degree of
reliability varies greatly. In fact, the predictive ground on which much
research is based involves the very genius of the chemical science; not even
a scientific treatise could cover the many relationships and their inconceiv-
able complexity. The developed answer appears to be that insofar as chem-
ists consider any particular relationship sufficiently advanced that prediction
of compounds and, to a certain extent, their properties is possible, the
patent laws will consider such predictability as indicating obviousness.68
The recognized relationships on which "invention" is most frequently
attacked are the homologous series 69 and halogen substitution.70  Patent
applications have also been attacked on the grounds that the compound in
question was produced by standard reactions, that it was built from known
structural groups, 71 or that the chemicals used to produce the proposed com-
65121 U.S.P.Q. 629 (P.O. Bd. App. 1959).
66d at 630.
67 Ex parte Nathan, 121 U.S.P.Q. 349 (P.O. Bd. App. 1956) ; Ex parte Ruddy,
121 U.S.P.Q. 427 (P.O. Ed. App. 1955); Ex parte Bergel, 121 U.S.P.Q. 522 (P.O.
Bd. App. 1949).
68 See, e.g., Ex parte Burtner, 121 U.S.P.Q. 345, 347 (P.O. Ed. App. 1951)
(relationship found not to be sufficiently advanced).
69 See notes 61-67 supra and accompanying text.
70 See note 32 mipra.
71 EX parte Morey, 59 U.S.P.Q. 110 (P.O. Bd. App. 1943); Ex parle Reister,
58 U.S.P.Q. 620 (P.O. Bd. App. 1942); Ex parte Muth, 41 U.S.P.Q. 679 (P.O. Ed.
App. 1938); see Ex parte Reuter, 61 U.S.P.Q. 528 (P.O. Bd. App. 1944).
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pound had a high degree of similarity to chemicals used to produce closely
related compounds.7 2
The typical complex case can be illustrated by Ex parte Burtner,73
where applicant sought a patent on a derivative of piperidine having a
methyl group attached to a nitrogen at the one position and an ethanol
radical at the two position.74 Prior art showed the same piperidine ring
but with the ethanol radical attached to the nitrogen and no methyl group
or other alkyl radical attached thereon. The only difference in the new
art, therefore, was the addition of an alkyl radical at the one position and
the shifting of the ethanol radical from the one position on the nitrogen to
the two position on a carbon. The applicant's claim was allowed after the
court decided that the compound was not a homologue (which would have
required a strong showing of utility in order to attain patentability). In
Ex parte Bhmenthal,75 the applicant obtained a patent upon a zirconyl
soap of the formula Zr2 0 3 (OOCR) 2 76 where the prior art disclosed a com-
pound ZrOOHC17H 35 COO. The patent examiner had rejected the com-
pound, apparently on the ground that it was obvious that organic radicals
or groups would combine with a zirconium base to form a soaplike product.
In another recent case,77 a patent was contested on grounds that the struc-
ture of the reacting chemicals was similar to that of previously known chem-
icals producing the same type of result, a resin. Here the applicant sought
a patent on a condensation product of 2-keto-5-imino-4-amino-4-ureido-
imidazolidine and an aldehyde; prior art showed such condensation products
with 2-keto-4, 5-diamino-imidazolidine and an aldehyde. The patent ex-
aminer noted the similarity of the chemicals and rejected the application,
largely because the ureido group in the applicant's compound was not known
to have an adverse effect in such resin-forming reactions and therefore the
compounds were of such similarity as to be obvious.78 Though the role
of the ureido group was uncertain and the advancement both in terms of
72 EX parte Lulek, 41 U.S.P.Q. 414 (P.O. Bd. App. 1938).
73 121 U.S.P.Q. 345 (P.O. Bd. App. 1951).
74 The structure was:
H





75114 U.S.P.Q. 512 (P.O. Bd. App. 1956).
76Where R is an aliphatic organic radical of at least four carbon atoms.
77 Thomas Boyd, 105 U.S.P.Q. 451 (P.O. Bd. App. 1954).
7
8 Id. at 451.
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scientific knowledge and utilitarian properties appears to be quite small, the
examiner's decision was overruled by the Board of Appeals.
Although the utility factor as a determinant of patentability does not
appear to weigh as heavily here as in the homologous series cases, it has,
nevertheless, found expression. For example, in Franz Bergel,79 a patent
on a pyridine compound with modified carboxyl groups was rejected "in
the absence of some unusual utility inherent in such a compound." 80
Within the recognized relationships where invention is questionable,
great difficulty is caused by the doctrine that a reference which clearly
names the compound or identifies it by structural formula precludes
patentability, even where the reference contains only an inoperative method
for producing the compound or no method at all.8 1  It would seem that
this is merely another way of saying that if someone was so certain that
a specific compound was possible that he published his belief, this is prima
facie proof of "obviousness to one skilled in the art." However, there
seems to be no compelling reason why a compound whose structure is
published as a possibility should be treated differently from one equally
predictable but unpublished. The cases which state the rule appear to
imply that there is a stronger presumption of unpatentability in the instance
of referred-to compounds, but because of the many factors involved in
patentability it is not possible to ascertain whether the doctrine is actually
persuasive. Strict application of the principle would mean that if lists
of the many possible compounds comprising the variations of substituted
groups were compiled and published, patent protection would be denied in
a vast number of cases to the first actual producer of the compound. The
cases seem to recognize the difficulty and assert that the doctrine has
limits. Whatever limits theoretically exist, however, they are not presently
discernible; the exact boundaries will have to be delineated on an ad hoc
basis. Although at present the cases have not attempted even the most
generalized limitation, some considerations concerning a desirable and
feasible treatment of the doctrine appear appropriate. Where an appli-
cant has produced a predictable product by substitution and the compound
has utility, the wide grant of a composition patent does not seem to be
justified. On the other hand, the utility of the product and its novelty
in the form of variation from prior compounds would justify at least the
issuance of a process patent on the new use. This solution, however,
suffers from the drawbacks previously noted: where the compound would
be employed by many small users, the process patent is economically
unenforceable. And the doctrine of contributory infringement, to prevent
the manufacture and sale of the compound used to infringe the process
79 121 U.S.P.Q. 522 (P.O. Bd. App. 1949).
80 Id. at 523.
81 See In re Kebrich, 40 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 780, 201 F.2d 951 (1953); In re
Shackell, 39 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 847, 194 F.2d 720 (1952) ; In re Stoll, 34 C.C.P.A.
(Patents) 1058, 161 F.2d 241 (1947); In re von Bramner, 29 C.C.P.A. (Patents)
1018, 127 F.2d 149 (1942).
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patent, is realistically available only where the compound is usable
solely in the patented process and is not a staple within the meaning of
section 271 (c). Thus, the problems of proof and notification may prevent
many process patents from having more than nominal value.
The unpatentability of compounds with obvious substitution groups
is illustrated clearly by In re Baranauckas,82 where the applicant was denied
a patent on a compound which involved only the substitution, in the
same position around the carbon atom, of chlorine for bromine. Here
there was no showing of superior properties; the court stated that it would
be assumed that bromine and chlorine, as members of the halogen
family, would behave in the same way-thereby implying that a failure
to show different and superior properties was a basis of rejection. On
the other hand, the utility factor will not receive as much emphasis where
some significant structural difference from prior art exists in the claimed
compound. For example, 2,2,3,4-tetrachlorobutyronitrile was held pat-
entable over 2,2-dichloroproprionitrile and 2,2,3-trichloro butyro amid
where the amid was readily convertible by standard means into the
nitrile 3 The Board of Appeals reasoned that the mere substitution of
an ethyl group for the methyl group in 2,2-dichloroproprionitrile or in
2,2,3-trichloro butyro amid (assuming the conversion of the amid group
to nitrile) would not give the tetra-chlor compound. Here, if the obvious
substitution of the ethyl for the methyl radical were the sole change, the
compound would be a mere unpatentable homologue. Moreover, merely
adding additional chlorine atoms to 2,2-dichloroproprionitrile would not
result in a patentable composition. But the double substitution step
(ethyl group and additional chlorine) did lend patentability.
One of the probable limitations on the doctrine of nonpatentability
of obvious substituted groups is that an obvious substitution may, like
predictable groups, be patentable under present law when the resulting
compound is vastly superior in utility to prior compounds. In EX parte
Carson,8 a dye, 3,6-dichlor-2-aminophenol-4-sulphonic acid coupled with
1-aryl-5-pyrazalone was held patentable over the reference monchloro
2-aminophenol-4-sulphonic acid coupled with the pyrazalone. In the latter
the single chlorine atom was in the six position whereas in the appli-
cant's compound it was in the three as well as the six. It would appear
that the substitution of a single atom would be obvious and not lend pat-
entability, but apparently the great difference in properties lent patentability
despite similarity to prior art compounds. Conversely, in Ex parte
Shelton,85 where a patent was sought on an anaesthetic which differed
from prior anaesthetics only in the substitution of chlorine in two positions
on a benzene ring, the Board of Appeals rejected the application because
8243 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 727, 228 F.2d 413 (1956).
83 John W. Teter, 105 U.S.P.Q. 191 (P.O. Bd. App. 1948).
84 78 U.S.P.Q. 93 (P.O. Bd. App. 1948).
85 121 U.S.P.Q. 526 (P.O. Bd. App. 1951).
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there was no showing that the proposed anaesthetic was superior utility-
wise to the unsubstituted compound.
The granting of patents on compounds for such slight differences
as those illustrated by Carson raises larger questions involving the pur-
poses of the patent law. No matter how useful a product may be com-
mercially, scientific knowledge is not advanced by its discovery where
substitution was obviously possible. On the other hand, these very useful
products might not have been developed but for the promise of patent
protection. A great deal of effort must be expended in order to find the
compound with unobvious utilitarian properties, even though the existence
of the compound may be evident.
Criticalness of the Range of Elements or Compounds Used
The patentability of compositions dependent upon criticalness of range
to attain desired results is contingent not upon the lack of obviousness
of the natural chemical affinity but rather on the use of precise amounts
of known and identified substances to attain those results. Salient in this
area are alloy patents, whose keynotes are utility and new properties.8 6
In Rem-Cru Titanium, Inc. v. Watson, 7 prior patents had claimed
aluminum-titanium alloys of 54 per cent titanium and 46 per cent aluminum.
The applicant's alloys were 54 per cent to 66 per cent titanium and 34
per cent to 46 per cent aluminum; thus the range had to some extent been
claimed. However, the prior art did not show the criticalness of range
which imparted the properties of resistance to oxidation at very high
temperatures, and the applicant's patent was granted. Similarly, in Torok
v. Watson,88 the claims were directed to a thermistor or temperature control
device composed of two metal oxides, one being chromic oxide in critical
proportions. The prior art contained references to a thermistor material
with chromic oxide as an ingredient but did not indicate the properties of
the critical range of chromic oxide; never had more than 40 per cent
chromic oxide previously been employed whereas applicant claimed not
less than 50 per cent with vastly improved qualities at high temperatures.
The court found patentability under the general proposition that applicant
had "added something to the sum of human knowledge." 89 And in Ex parte
Guillaud,90 a patent was granted on a magnetic material which, having
high permeability and low hysteresis losses, was highly suitable for trans-
former cores. The material consisted of mixtures in the range of 49.7
8sBecket v. Coe, 98 F.2d 332 (D.C. Cir. 1938). See also Ludlum Steel Co. v.
Terry, 37 F.2d 153 (N.D.N.Y. 1928); American Stainless Steel Co. v. Ludlum Steel
Co., 290 Fed. 103 (2d Cir. 1923); General Elec. Co. v. Hoskin Mfg. Co., 224 Fed.
464 (7th Cir. 1915).
87147 F. Supp. 915 (D.D.C. 1956).
88 122 F. Supp. 788 (D.D.C. 1954).
89 Obviously this language cannot be taken literally, for it would justify patents
even for compounds useful only in pure science.
90 121 U.S.P.Q. 352 (P.O. Bd. App. 1958).
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per cent (molecular percentages) to 50.6 per cent iron sesquioxide, 0.3
per cent to 7.5 per cent iron pentoxide, 24 per cent to 38 per cent man-
ganese protoxide, and the remainder in zinc oxide. Prior art showed use
of iron sesquioxide, manganese protoxide and zinc oxide in the molar
ratio of 50:25:25. The claimed composition, however, had twice the
permeability, a desirable characteristic, and approximately one-third of
the undesirable hysteresis loss. These utilitarian features were the basis
of the patent despite the very small differences in percentage composition
from the prior art.
Cases in this area frequently hold that the qualities imparted by the
criticalness of range must be physical or chemical and not commercial. 91
This distinction, however, is difficult of precise application and does not
appear to be a helpful tool for analysis of the criticalness cases. For
example, in Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Sales Affiliates, Inc.,9 2 the
plaintiff-patentee claimed a hair waving solution of mercaptan salts in pH
range from seven to ten.93 Prior art patents showed use of mercaptan
salts of at least pH ten. The patentee did not claim the criticalness of
the lower limit of pH seven and in fact good curls were obtained above
pH- ten. The claim was based on only the criticalness of the pH1 ten as an
upper limit for obtaining the tightest curls in the shortest possible time.
While the composition did in fact accomplish this, it was held to be a
mere commercial phenomenon and not the physical or chemical phenomenon
which a critical range patent must have to disclose invention. Explanation
of the case on this ground is difficult, however, inasmuch as the com-
mercial property, the tighter curl, is-if one is to believe scientific cause
and effect-based on the chemical or physical property imparted by the
lower pH, all other factors remaining constant. It appears, however, that
the advance was so minute as to be unpatentable in any event.
The difficulty with the distinction between physical and commercial
properties is illustrated by a case involving an ammoniated dentifrice
patent. 4 There, a dentifrice containing a certain percentage of urea and
dibasic ammonium phosphate was held patentable though both ammonium
salts and urea had been used in prior dentifrices.95 The court held that
criticalness was shown by a claim of a sufficient amount of the substances
to inhibit lactobacilli (decay-causing bacteria) ; success in tests was shown
in that decay was inhibited to a greater extent than by other known
dentifrices.96 The physical phenomenon leading to the commercial utility
clearly was the inhibition of the bacterial growth. Again, it appears that
91 See Kwik Set, Inc. v. Welch Grape Juice Co., 86 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1956).
92 233 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1956).
93 A pH scale provides a graduated measurement of acidity and alkalinity.
94 University of Ill. Foundation v. Block Drug Co., 133 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Ill.
1955).
95 The McCall patent (1929) used less than 1% of ammonium salts in a dentifrice,
and a thesis published in 1924 showed the relationship between ammonia content of
saliva and dental cavities.
96133 F. Supp. at 587.
UTILITY IN CHEMICAL PATENTS
scientific laws of cause and effect dictate that any property which leads
to greater commercial utility must have some basis in physical phenomena
whether known or unknown. In the ammoniated dentifrice case, the
exact reason for the commercial success was known; but in Helene Curtis,
the explanation of the phenomenon which made for quicker and tighter
curls was not known. It is possible, therefore, that patentability hinged
upon the ability of the applicant to explain why his compound worked.
However, inasmuch as such a result would clearly conflict with the
settled rule that one need not know the theoretical basis of his invention
in order to secure a patent,97 it is more lilkely that the different results
derive from the contrasting utility-a tighter curl is relatively unimpressive
as a manifestation of useful properties while destruction of decay-causing
bacteria, a step toward solution of an important hygienic problem, is
significant.
Patentability of mixtures of known compounds claiming criticalness
may be easier if one of the ingredients exhibits previously unknown prop-
erties. In Bereslavsky v. United States,98 a compound, mesitylene, known
to exist in gasoline was added to gasoline in greater amounts than were
naturally present, thus producing a mixture with superior anti-knock
properties. The compound was held patentable even though no exact
range was given and the amount used was dependent upon the skill of
technicians and mechanics in adapting the mixture to particular com-
pression ratios. Merely finding a new use for an old compound, mesitylene,
would not have sustained a composition patent 99 and the broad claim of
"greater amounts as needed for a particular engine" seems to make a
claim of criticalness defective for vagueness. The decision seems to rest
on the invention which arises from the combination of discovery of un-
known properties and addition in such quantity as to impart significant
utility.
Prior Existence of Compounds in More Complex Substances
A large amount of chemical research is expended in extracting from
various complex substances the active composition or compositions which
give the mixture its desirable properties. A compound may be novel and
patentable even if it previously existed as an ingredient in another sub-
stance. However, if the art showed both the existence of the active sub-
stance and also its chemical composition, the purified and isolated product
is not patentable. 100 This is true even if the prior art was incorrect or
unclear as to the existence of the substance-as where a mixture was pre-
97 Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Rubber Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428 (1911).
98 124 F. Supp. 356 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
99 See notes 52-58 supra and accompanying text It may sustain a process claim
but not a composition claim since it was a known and identified compound.
looIn re Marden, 18 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1046, 47 F.2d 958 (1931).
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sumed to contain dibasic lead stearate, but it might well have been a
mixture of monobasic and tribasic.110
Isolation of the active component generally does not entitle the
isolator to a patent on an isolated ingredient where it has the same showing
of utility as the mother substance-the difference being only in degree
of activity.10 2  However, in the case of isolation of a useful compound
from a previously unusable substance, it appears that a patent can be
obtained even if the reaction by which the product was formed was iden-
tified in the prior art.10 3 It would seem that no invention is required to
isolate a known compound-as the patent laws have always held-and
the mere fact that the isolated product possesses great utility should not
in itself lend composition patentability. Such an operation appears to be
little more than developing a better way to obtain an old product.
104
There is no doubt that had the product existed in its pure state prior
to isolation and applicant found use for it, he could not obtain a patent
on the composition.
The question of whether a compound isolated from an old mixture 105
is patentable frequently resolves itself into one of whether the prior art
discloses the active ingredients of the mixture sufficiently that isolating
the active compound, or making it independently, cannot be called inven-
tion. In Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp.,10 6 Merck's
patent on vitamin 312 was sustained against a charge that the claim was
merely a reproduction of the active ingredient in animal liver which
had a similar, though significantly less potent, effect in reducing anemia.
Merck produced the vitamin not from liver but by an independent process;
however, it tested the efficiency of the vitamin by a method utilizing an
organism whose growth was linear with that of known antipernicious
factors found in liver, thus raising the inference that Merck's B12 and the
antipernicious ingredient in liver were the same compound. Nevertheless
B12 was held patentable inasmuch as, even if it were actually present in
liver,1°7 it had not been identified and isolated from liver at the time of
Merck's synthesis. Furthermore, the marked efficacy of B, 2 over liver
101 In re Kebrich, 40 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 780, 201 F.2d 951 (1953).
102 Cochrane v. Badische Anilin, 111 U.S. 293 (1881).
lo3EX parte Hillyer, 102 U.S.P.Q. 126 (P.O. Bd. App. 1953).
104 The Wood-Paper Patent, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 566, 593-94 (1873).
10 5 The Patent Office seems to have drawn a distinction between a single com-
pound existing in a mixture of other compounds and the breaking up of a single
compound into isomeric compounds. Thus, a patent was granted for -artenerol
which was split from dl-artenerol where the latter was therapeutically effective but
the isolated 1-artenerol was markedly more so. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Watson, 135
F. Supp. 173 (D.D.C. 1955).
106253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958).
107 This interpretation of the facts of the case differs from that of the Comment
in 27 GEo. WAsH. L. Rav. 256 (1958), which appeared to proceed on the assumption
that it was known at the time of Bl 2's discovery that it was present in liver, whereas
its actual discovery in liver occurred at a somewhat later time.
UTILITY IN CHEMICAL PATENTS
extracts was a scientific advance which clearly should be protected by the
patent laws.
Two conclusions appear to be indicated by the isolation cases. If the
compounds were not identified and were not known to possess utility,
mere isolation will make them patentable. 08  However, no matter how
useful a resulting compound may be, isolation of identified compounds will
not lend patentability. 10 9 A case which appears to lie somewhere between
these two extremes is Ex parte Konkle." 0  The applicant received a
patent on a rubber vulcanizing and filling agent consisting of four com-
pounds. Prior art showed use of three of the four compounds for the
same purpose, and one of the compounds used in the prior art mixture
contained in its polymer chain the fourth ingredient of the applicant's
mixture; thus the fourth ingredient existed in chemical combination in a
more complex compound instead of the usual case wherein the compound
exists as part of a mixture of many compounds. The proposed mixture
with the isolated ingredient as a separate compound showed greater
utilitarian properties than the prior art in eliminating the problem of
hardening of the vulcanized material, and on this showing the patent was
granted.
CONCLUSION
The case analysis suggests that "utility," as used synonymously with
"unexpected beneficial properties" or "new result," is the weightiest factor
in the granting of chemical patents. This is not surprising inasmuch as
the problem of what is "new and unobvious" would be so complex if
viewed separately from usefulness per se that utility is the only sufficiently
objective standard by which advancements in the chemical art can be
measured. In contrast, the Supreme Court has rejected for mechanical
patent applications any test of invention in which utility and commercial
success are principal factors."' Yet for such compositions as alloys
(known elements) and extracted derivatives (unknown compounds exist-
ing in less usable substances), utility appears to be the sole available
test.
Where the chemical composition sought to be patented is an actual
compound, the existence of which is predictable, patentability hinges on a
similar showing of utilitarian properties. If the prior art of a predictable
compound shows properties similar to that of the proposed compound, a
stronger showing of utility will be required. And if the prior art, which
makes a compound predictable, gives no indication of the new properties,
the minimum statutory showing of utility apparently will suffice.
108 Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 196 Fed. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).
109 itz re Marden, 18 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1046, 47 F.2d 958 (1931).
110 121 U.S.P.Q. 628 (P.O. Bd. App. 1957).
"' Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 153
(1950).
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The chemical patent law as it has developed is anomalous in the
light of the long-standing doctrine that a "new use for an old composition
of matter is not patentable." 112 And a composition whose existence is
predictable but whose utilitarian properties are unforeseen would appear
to be nothing more than a "new use for an old composition of matter,"
and so justify only the usually less valuable process patent rather than a
product patent.113 However, it appears that the meaning of "predictable
compound" and "old composition of matter" are not the same. Clearly
an "old composition" is one which has been previously produced or used;
but in all of the cases where patents were granted on predictable com-
pounds they had not been previously produced or used. And inasmuch
as it appears that, under the standard of obviousness to one skilled in the
art, it is the predictability of utilitarian properties rather than of the ex-
istence of the compound that is the usual bar to patentability, the doctrine
that a published reference to the compound's existence, even if it does not
show a method of production or means of use, is a bar to patentability
seems inconsistent.
1 14
Inasmuch as the major portion of chemical research is directed toward
finding "new results" from predictable compounds, the granting of the
broad and valuable composition patents for what appear to be simply
"new uses" may be necessary in some cases. However, it appears that
in many other instances valid patents can be obtained where the advance-
ment in terms of both science and the useful arts is quite small: for exam-
ple, a predictable homologue which has minimum utility is patentable
provided the utility was not foreseen, even though the compound produces
results no more beneficial than those obtained from other materials used
for the same purpose. For such cases, only a process patent seems neces-
sary or desirable. An alternative solution might be a shortened monopoly
period for such "petty patents."
M.H.M.
112 See note 52 supra.
113 Such "new uses" are patentable under the 1952 Patent Act. See note 2 supra
and accompanying text.
114 See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
